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ABSTRACT 
 
An extensive body of literature indicates that political uncertainty has an impact on the 
price and riskiness of financial assets. Countries with a stable political field offer 
companies a more predictable and reliable working environment. In developed countries, 
presidential elections are one of the most influential political events. United States is the 
world’s largest economy and the office of the president has a lot of power compared to 
many other developed countries. Therefore, it is intuitively plausible that U.S. 
presidential elections could affect the stock markets as well. Previous literature has 
focused on three main types of election effects: the short-term effects, the election cycle 
effect over the four years of the U.S presidential mandate, and the party effect, whether 
it’s a Republican or a Democrat candidate who wins the election. 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the short-term effects that the U.S. presidential 
elections have on the stock market. The data consists of daily price data from six major 
world indices and five presidential elections from 2000 to 2016. A special focus is on the 
2016 elections. To examine the stock market reaction to the elections, an event study 
methodology is employed. The abnormal returns from the first trading day after the 
election result was announced are examined, along with three longer event windows to 
better grasp the stock market reactions to the elections. 
 
The results indicate that U.S. presidential elections have a short-term impact on the stock 
markets, both in terms of returns and market volatility. This effect seems to be larger and 
clearer for U.S. markets than foreign markets. U.S. indices also behave very similarly, 
suggesting that diversifying across domestic markets will not protect investors from 
domestic political risks. Certain industries, however, are impacted differently. In 
particular, industries that are sensitive to regulations and government policies are 
impacted more. Furthermore, these types of industries seem to prefer Republican winners 
over Democratic ones. The results for international markets are more mixed. Overall, 
European markets seem to follow their U.S. counterparts more closely than Asian 
markets. In some cases, Asian indices even exhibited opposite reactions than U.S. 
markets. In the light of these results, investors should consider political elections and their 
effects on assets when making investment decisions. 
 
KEYWORDS:  U.S. Presidential Elections, Stock Market, Political Risk, Event 
Study, Efficient Markets 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Previous literature indicates that political uncertainty has an impact on both the returns 
and risk levels of financial assets (see e.g. Pantzalis et al. 2000; Lehkonen & Heimonen 
2015, Bekaert & Hodrick 2018: 603-607). This is also intuitively plausible, because a 
stable and predictable working environment is essential for the well-being of companies. 
 
According to Wisniewski (2016), since the end of the 20th century, an increasing amount 
of academics have started to study the influence political events and government actions 
have on stock market price fluctuations. This relatively recent body of interdisciplinary 
research connects the fields of political science and finance. It examines the impact 
various topics, such as political uncertainty, political orientation of incumbents in office, 
as well as political elections, have on stock market returns. Schwert (1989) observed that 
financial and economic factors fail to fully explain stock price volatility. Considering this, 
numerous scholars have started to focus on political uncertainty as a potential cause for 
large price movements. Political uncertainty is positively related with political risk, which 
leads to unstable and unpredictable economic and social environment.  
 
Political risk is generally defined as the risk of government actions negatively affecting a 
company’s cash flows (Bekaert & Hodrick 2018: 603). Elections, and especially 
presidential elections, are considered as one of the most influential political events (Hung 
2013). In the United States, the importance of presidential elections is even more 
pronounced, due to the status of the U.S. in the global world. The U.S. has the world’s 
biggest economy, and their global influence in terms of economy, military matters and 
many others, is immense (IMF 2018). In addition, the office of the president wields more 
power and influence in the U.S. than presidents in many other countries, making the 
presidential elections even more impactful. Therefore, it is important for investors to 
understand how presidential elections affect the value of their investments, i.e. the stock 
market. 
 
Many empirical studies have focused on researching the correlation between U.S. 
presidential elections and domestic and international stock market movements. Existing 
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literature demonstrate the existence of three main effects that elections have on stock 
market prices. The first one is a positive, short-term impact, also known as the bull-run 
effect. It generally happens within a few weeks around the Election date. The second one, 
the election cycle, is a 4-years recurring pattern in stock price fluctuations that coincides 
with the U.S presidential mandate. Lastly, the party effect implies that the incumbent’s 
party, whether they are Republican or Democrat, might also impact the stock markets.  
In addition to demonstrating the existence of a relationship between presidential elections 
and stock market fluctuations, academics have also studied the reasons behind it. (Hung 
2013.) According to available research, presidential elections induce three recurring 
phenomena: predictable macroeconomic policies, widely shared investors sentiment and 
fluctuating market uncertainty. They likely all play a part in explaining why presidential 
elections affect stock market prices.  
 
Even though an extensive part of the existing literature focuses on the impact the U.S. 
presidential elections have on domestic stock markets, some researchers have directed 
their attention on the impact U.S. presidential elections might also have on foreign stock 
markets. While there is some documentation to support the ability of the U.S presidential 
election cycle to forecast international stock returns, there seem to be a lack of evidence 
to confirm the existence of a party or bull-run election effect in international cases (see 
e.g. Hung 2013).  
 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effects of U.S. presidential elections on the 
stock market. The aim is to determine whether the outcome of the elections affects stock 
market returns, and the magnitude and nature of that impact, if there is one. A special 
focus is placed on the 2016 elections due to its particular nature. Donald Trump’s election 
as the 45th President of the United States on November 8, 2016, was remarkable in many 
ways. His presidential campaign officially started a year and a half before, on June 16, 
2015 at the Trump Tower, the Trump Organization’s headquarters, in New York City. In 
his first campaign rally, he announced his official candidacy and campaign slogan “Make 
America Great Again”, as well as highlighted domestic issues such as illegal immigration, 
offshoring of American jobs and the U.S national debt. At that point, Ladbrokes Coral, a 
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British betting company, offered 150/1 odds of Donald Trump being elected President of 
the United States (bbc.co.uk 2016). 
 
On August 21, 2015, the Federal Election Commission revealed that Donald Trump was 
the only major Republican who did not yet have a super PAC backing his candidacy. 
Political Action Committees (PACs) are organizations formed to privately raise money 
for a political campaign in order to influence the election. Super PACs can raise unlimited 
contributions to finance independent expenditures, such as a website or advertisements in 
favour of a clearly identified candidate. However, they cannot donate directly to a 
candidate’s campaign. (fec.gov.) Even though on August 6, during the first Republican 
primary debate on Fox News, Trump mentioned the possibility of a third-party candidacy, 
he eventually pledged allegiance to the Republican Party in September 2015 (cnn.com 
2015). 
 
Seventeen major candidates entered the 2016 Republican Party presidential primaries and 
caucuses, taking place between the 1st of February and the 7th of June 2016. On May 3, 
Donald Trump was declared the Republican presumptive nominee. On July 19, during 
the Republican National Convention, Donald Trump and the Indiana Governor Mike 
Pence were officially announced as the Republican presidential and vice-presidential 
candidates. However, with 44.9% of the popular primary vote, Trump had the lowest 
percentage for a major party candidate since the 1988 Democratic primaries. (cnn.com.) 
 
Three presidential debates between Donald Trump and the Democratic candidate Hillary 
Clinton took place on September 26, October 9 and October 19, 2016. The first one, held 
at New York’s Hofstra University, was the most-watched debate in the US history, with 
over 84 million viewers. Many polls took place after each debate to survey respondents’ 
opinion on who had won it. The large majority of polls, if not all of them, pointed at 
Hillary Clinton as the winner of the three 2016 presidential debates. On October 24, 
Trump received his first and only endorsement from a major newspaper, The Las Vegas 
Review-Journal while many usually Republican-leaning papers, such as The Houston 
Chronicle, The Dallas Morning News or The Arizona Republic, endorsed Clinton. 
(bbc.com, 2016.) 
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And yet, on November 8, 2016, Trump won the Electoral College and became the 45th 
President of the US. In addition to winning traditional Republican States such as Texas, 
Indiana, Oklahoma and Tennessee, Donald Trump succeeded in traditional swing states 
such as Florida and Ohio. Furthermore, he became the first Republican to win the 
Democratic States of Pennsylvania, Michigan and Wisconsin since the 1980s. Hillary 
Clinton, despite winning the popular vote by more than 2.5 million votes, lost the 
elections (bbc.com). The media, the polls, the forecasts and even the betting markets had 
failed to predict the results of the 2016 US Presidential elections. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that the event came as a shock for the financial markets as well. 
1.1. Purpose of the thesis 
The purpose of this thesis is to determine if U.S. presidential elections have an impact on 
the stock market. More specifically, the aim is to investigate how the presidential 
elections affect both domestic, i.e. U.S. and foreign stock market indices. The indices 
examined are the S&P500 index, NASDAQ Composite, Dow Jones Industrial Average, 
EUROSTOXX 50, Hang Seng and Nikkei 250 stock index. The elections examined are 
the 2016, 2012, 2008, 2004 and 2000 presidential elections. A special focus is placed on 
the 2016 elections because they are the most recent and because they were somewhat 
particular by nature. For the 2016 and 2012 elections, the potential impact on individual 
industries is also statistically examined. 
 
This study focuses mainly on the short-term impacts of the elections. In order to do this, 
an event study methodology is employed. This is explained in detail later in chapter four. 
Previous literature is also discussed and analyzed. Previous findings are then compared 
to the findings of this thesis to see if the latest elections differed from previous ones in 
any way. 
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1.2. Structure of the study and research hypotheses 
The structure of the study is as follows. Chapter two introduces different political risk 
factors and the U.S. Presidential election system. Previous empirical findings are also 
introduced, analyzed and compared to see how political risk and presidential elections 
affect the stock market. Chapter three introduces and discusses the efficient market 
hypothesis (EHM), which is crucial to the methodology used in this thesis, i.e. the event 
study methodology. Chapter four presents data and methodology that are used in this 
study. The event study methodology and the rationale behind it is also discussed in detail. 
In chapter five, empirical findings from the 2000-2016 U.S. presidential elections are 
presented and analyzed. Chapter six concludes and presents potential implications for 
investors. 
 
The aim of the study is to see whether U.S. presidential elections have a short-term impact 
on both domestic and foreign stock markets. Therefore, the main research question of this 
thesis is: Do United States presidential elections have an impact on the stock market? 
 
This potential effect is measured with abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs). In addition, the political party of the election winner might affect the direction 
and magnitude of the potential market reaction. Thus, the following hypotheses are 
derived: 
 
H1: There are abnormal returns around or following U.S. presidential elections. 
 
H2: Stock markets react differently to Republican and Democratic election winners. 
 
H3: The reaction to U.S. Presidential elections is different across domestic and foreign 
markets. 
 
H4: Industries that are sensitive to government policies and regulations react positively 
to Republican election winners and negatively to Democratic winners. 
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2. POLITICAL RISK 
Political risk factors include the risk of expropriation, contract repudiation, currency 
exchange controls and laws that prevent companies from transferring their earnings out 
of the host country. Taxes, regulation, corruption, civil strife and wars are also political 
risks. Changes in these factors affect the working environment of companies and therefore 
their returns. Different political risk factors are more prominent in developed and 
developing countries. In developed countries, legislation concerning taxes, regulation, 
tariffs and similar issues are something investors have to worry about whereas in 
developing and more politically unstable countries more serious issues have to be 
considered (Lehkonen & Heimonen 2015; Bekaert & Hodrick 2018: 603-607). In this 
paper, the focus is on the U.S., which is considered as one of the most politically stable 
countries in the world. 
 
Quantifying political risk is challenging, although events related to political risk can be 
easily observed. Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2013) created an economic policy uncertainty 
index based on three main components. The first one is the number of major domestic 
newspaper articles about policy uncertainty. The second is forgone earnings from 
expiring tax code provisions. A general definition of forgone revenue is the difference 
between realized earnings and potential earnings that could have been obtained in the 
absence of fees, expense or lost time. The last component of the economic policy 
uncertainty index is the level of disagreement among specialists about future levels of 
government expenditure and inflation. Pástor and Veronesi (2013) find a positive 
correlation between this index and both realized and implied volatility of the S&P500 
index.  
 
Another widely used method is the Political Risk Services (PRS) Group’s ICRG Rating 
System. PRS Group provides on a monthly basis the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG), along with the Political Risk Yearbook and other data sets. The ICRG ratings 
can be split up into financial, economic and political risk components and their 
subcomponents. The thirteen political risk attributes include, for example, corruption, 
external conflicts and the role of military in politics. These components allow assessing 
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political risk on a relative basis. (Lehkonen & Heimonen 2015: 84; Bekaert & Hodrick 
2018: 623.) 
2.1. U.S. Presidential Election System 
In the United States, presidential elections take place every four years. The Election Day 
is held on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November. The election process 
starts with caucuses and primary elections. States use these two methods to choose a 
potential presidential nominee. Caucuses are local gatherings where voters vote for a 
particular candidate at the end of the meeting. Primaries use generally secret ballots for 
voting. Next in the process are nominating conventions where political parties each select 
a nominee to unite behind. During the convention, a vice presidential running mate is also 
announced by each presidential nominee. The candidates then campaign across the 
country to explain their plans and opinions to voters and take part in debates with 
candidates form other parties. (USA.gov.) 
 
Unlike in other elections in the U.S., the president and vice president are not elected 
directly by the people (using a popular vote). Instead, the presidents are chosen by electors 
through a process called the Electoral College. The idea behind using electors comes from 
the Constitution. The founders of the United States saw the Electoral College as a 
compromise between a popular vote and electing the president in Congress. (USA.gov.) 
 
Including Washington, D.C.’s three electors, there are 538 electors in total. The number 
of electors each state gets is determined according to how many members of Congress 
(including House and Senate) the state has. The political parties of each state choose their 
own potential electors. When, how and who is chosen to be an elector varies by state. All 
votes that are casted for a presidential candidate go to a state-wide tally. In 48 states and 
Washington, D.C., the winner receives all electoral votes for that state. This means that 
the electors of the winner’s party get to vote in the Electoral College. Maine and Nebraska 
use a proportional system called the Congressional District Method to choose their 
electors. A presidential candidate then needs a minimum of 270 electoral votes (more 
than half) to win the presidential election. The electors are not obligated by the 
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Constitution to vote according to the popular vote of the people that they represent. 
However, electors usually follow their people’s and party’s choice. (USA.gov). 
 
It is possible to win the Electoral College but lose the popular vote. In other words, it is 
possible that a candidate wins a combination of states and reaches the needed 270 electors 
without actually receiving the majority of votes across the country. This has happened 
five times, most recently in 2016 when Donald Trump was chosen as the President of the 
United States. (USA.gov). This also shows that the latest elections were very tight. 
 
There are nowadays two major political parties in the United States: the Democratic and 
the Republican. The modern-day Democratic Party was founded in 1828 by supporters of 
Andrew Jackson, the seventh U.S. President, who held office from 1829 to 1837. It is the 
oldest continuing party in the United States. During the 19th century, the Party supported 
state sovereignty and limited government, as well as slavery. (Janda, Berry & Goldman 
2010: 276.)  Contrarily, the Republican Party, also known as the Grand Old Party (GOP), 
was established in 1854 partly to fight against the expansion of slavery in the United 
States. Traditionally, the GOP supported industries such as banks and railroads and it was 
in favor of both protectionism through high tariffs and the gold standard. Following the 
election of Abraham Lincoln in 1860 as the first Republican President, the party 
dominated the U.S. political scene for more than 70 years, playing a major part in the 
Union victory in the American Civil War (1861-1865) and the resulting abolition of 
slavery. (Gould 2012: 1849.) 
 
The core beliefs of both the Democratic and Republican Parties have evolved since their 
early days. However, their main values and focuses remain different and are often 
expressed in opposition with each other’s. The Democrats highlight topics such as equal 
pay, job creation, education, universal healthcare and clean energy. According to their 
official website, “Democrats believe that we’re greater together than we are on our own 
– that this country succeeds when everyone gets a fair shot, everyone does their fair share, 
and everyone plays by the same rules.” The Democrats also state that their party wants to 
build an economy that lifts up all Americans, not just the ones who are at the top. They 
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have been an advocate for topics such as civil rights, social security, stricter gun laws, 
trade unions and women’s rights. (Democrats.org; U.S. Diplomatic Mission to Germany). 
 
On the other hand, the Republicans underline individual rights, safety and reducing the 
governments’ involvement in people’s affairs. In 2019, the official Republican Party 
agenda includes empowering individuals, “getting government off of Americans’ backs”, 
keeping United States safe at home and strong abroad, securing borders, protecting all 
human life, preserving constitutional rights, cutting taxes and upholding the principles 
and values that have made America great. The Republicans also openly express their 
critical opinion about their rival, the Democratic Party. In their website, the Republicans 
state that “In contrast to House Democrats, who are embracing socialism, and pushing 
radical, far-left policies, we’re fighting to keep America safe, prosperous and free.” 
(GOP.gov; U.S. Diplomatic Mission to Germany). 
 
In a few words, the Democratic Party is usually considered to be more liberal, while 
Republicans are seen as more conservative. Democrats generally believe that government 
has an obligation to provide social and economic programs for those who need them. 
Republicans are not necessarily opposed to such programs but believe they are too costly 
to taxpayers. Republicans put more emphasis on supporting private enterprises in the 
belief that a strong private sector makes citizens less dependent on the government. They 
consider self-regulated markets and individual achievements as the main drivers of 
economic prosperity. Therefore, the traditional belief is that the markets prefer 
republicans. (USA.gov; U.S. Diplomatic Mission to Germany) 
2.2. Previous literature & empirical findings  
a. Political risk and stock markets  
 
Changes in government policies, laws and regulations can strongly impact companies’ 
operational environment and investment returns, thus affecting firms’ values and the 
stock markets. One type of political event that has grave consequences on the economy 
and market sentiment is wars and armed conflicts. For example, Deger and Smith (1983) 
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demonstrated that substantial military expenditure hinders investment and economic 
growth, both in OECD and emerging markets. Furthermore, Rigobon and Sack (2005) 
empirically study the impact the most recent war in Iraq had on U.S. stock markets. The 
results show that investors preferred safer or more liquid alternatives and moved away 
from risky assets because of the war risk, causing stock market prices to decline.  
 
Terrorist attacks also have a severe impact on stock markets, even though the magnitude 
of price fluctuations varies across different industries. Carter and Simkins (2004) 
illustrate in their empirical study that the airlines industry is especially sensitive to acts 
of terror, in particular around the World Trade Center attack on September 11, 2001. In 
addition to facing flight bans afterwards, airlines also suffered from significant decrease 
in air travel because of the strong psychological effects the attack had on people. In their 
comprehensive empirical study, Chesney, Reshetar and Karaman (2011) measure the 
impact of terrorism on market behaviour by considering terrorist events that happened in 
25 countries over 11 years. The authors confirm that insurance companies and airlines are 
the most negatively impacted industries, while banking is the sector least sensitive to 
terrorist attacks.  
 
Lastly, other events that can lead to major political change and, thus, impact the pricing 
of stocks, are coup d’états, revolutions or even assassination attempts on an incumbent or 
political leader. An interesting event supporting this argument is what happened in the 
U.S. on April 23, 2013. The official Twitter account of Associated Press, the biggest not-
for-profit American news agency, was hacked. A hoax tweet was released, mentioning 
President Obama being injured due to two explosions at the White House. According to 
Zamansky (2013), the U.S. stock markets plummeted in consequence of this tweet. For 
example, the Dow Jones index declined by about 150 points and a total of $136 billion in 
stock market capitalization vanished, before quickly rebounding once Associated Press 
explained the situation. (Wisniewski 2016: 20). 
 
Low political risk in a country means lower uncertainty for organisations and investors, 
due to a more stable and predictable economic environment. Lehkonen & Heimonen 
(2015) examine the effects of political risk on emerging stock markets. They use 
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annualized panel data for 49 emerging markets between 2000-2012 and find that 
decreases in political risk lead to higher returns. Lehkonen et al. also find that political 
risk begins to decline after a certain threshold level of democracy. (Lehkonen & 
Heimonen 2015: 77). 
 
Elections, especially for top offices, are a major political event for every country. Their 
results give investors valuable information about the macroeconomic and societal policies 
that are likely to be implemented by the election winner during the coming years. As a 
result, one may expect elections to have a significant impact on stock markets. Pantzalis, 
Stangeland & Turtle (2000) examine the behaviour of stock market indices around 
political election dates across 33 countries between 1974-1995. Using an event study 
methodology, the authors find a positive and significant market reaction during the two-
week period preceding the elections. Only elections for top offices in each country are 
considered, i.e. presidential and/or parliamentary elections. (Pantzalis et al. 2000: 1575, 
1601). 
 
The positive stock market reaction is shown to be a function of a country’s level of 
economic, political and press freedom, and a function of the success of the incumbent in 
being re-elected and the timing of the election. The positive effect is found to be strongest 
(largest CARs) in less-free countries when incumbents lose the elections. Pantzalis et al. 
(2000) find strong positive abnormal returns leading up to the elections especially in less 
free countries when the opposition wins, and in elections that are called early and lost by 
the incumbent government. The results of Pantzalis et al. are in line with Brown et al.’s 
(1988) uncertain information hypothesis (UIH). (Pantzalis et al. 2000: 1575, 1601). 
 
Brown, Harlow and Tinic (1988) develop the uncertain information hypothesis in order 
to explain the reaction of rational, risk-averse investors in response to the appearance of 
unexpected information. The UIH model relies on three main assumptions: the first one 
is that investors usually set stock prices before they know the full consequences of a major 
financial event. The second one is that after there is news of a startling financial event, 
both the risk and expected returns of the concerned firms systematically increase. 
Whether the surprising event is favorable or unfavorable, stock prices are immediately 
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set below their conditional anticipated values by risk-averse investors. Once the 
uncertainty about the final outcome is eventually resolved, ensuing price changes are on 
average positive. The last assumption is that price movements will be larger after negative 
news than positive news. The authors empirically study over nine thousand events, both 
market wide and firm specific, to test the uncertain information hypothesis. The results 
are consistent with the uncertain information hypothesis and confirm that the market 
reacts efficiently to uncertain and imperfect information. (Brown et al. 1988.) 
 
b. Elections & U.S stock markets 
 
The USA, in addition to being considered as one of the most politically stable countries 
in the world, is also the world’s largest economy with a GDP of USD 21.44 trillion in 
2019, as well as the largest recipient of foreign direct investments, with an inflow of USD 
251.8 billion in 2018 (UNCTAD 2019: 212). The prominent status of the United States 
in international trade explains why a lot of research examines the effect U.S presidential 
elections have on both domestic and international stock markets. 
 
Previous literature has focused on three main types of election effects: the short-term bull-
run effect, the election cycle effect over the four years of the U.S presidential mandate, 
and the party effect, whether it’s a Republican or Democrat candidate who wins the 
election. 
 
Focusing on the party effect, Niederhoffer, Gibbs & Bullock (1970) examine whether the 
traditional Wall Street view that the market prefers Republicans is accurate. If the market 
does prefer Republicans, there should be a general feeling of ebullience on the days 
following a Republican victory. This hypothesis turns out to be true. The market rose the 
day following the Presidential election on eight of the nine occasions that a Republican 
has won. However, the authors find no systematic differences in the performance of the 
market during Republican and Democratic administrations, except that during the third 
year of Democratic administrations the market performs significantly better than during 
the third year of Republican administrations. Thus, there appears to be no long-term 
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pattern in market movements which would justify Wall Street's Republican bias. 
(Niederhoffer et al. 1970). 
 
In addition, Santa-Clara & Valkanov (2003) also investigate the relationship between 
presidential elections and the stock market. Contrary to traditional believes, the authors 
find that the excess return in the stock market over the three-month Treasury bill is higher 
under Democratic presidencies than under Republican terms; nine percent for the value-
weighted CRSP portfolio and 16 percent for the equal-weighted portfolio. This difference 
in returns is greater for small firms than for companies with a large market capitalization. 
Furthermore, Santa-Clara et al. find no evidence of large excess returns around the actual 
election dates. The difference in excess returns is found to accumulate homogeneously 
throughout the presidential term. (Santa-Clara et al. 2003: 1841, 1869-1870.) 
 
According to Santa-Clara et al. (2003), business-cycle variables related to expected 
returns cannot explain the observed difference in returns. There is also no difference 
regarding the riskiness of the stock market between presidential terms that could justify 
such a risk premium. Therefore, the difference in returns throughout the presidential cycle 
is, according to the authors, still a puzzle. (Santa-Clara et al. 2003: 1841, 1869-1870.) 
 
More generally, and without focusing on any specific winning party, Wong & McAleer 
(2009) show in their research paper the existence of a 4-year presidential election cycle 
in U.S. stock prices. Empirically, the U.S. stock market closely followed the Presidency 
timeline of the ten administrations in place between 1965 and 2003, from President 
Lyndon Johnson to President George W. Bush. Stock prices decreased during the first 
half of the presidential mandates, reaching their lowest level during the second year. They 
raised again in the second half, hitting a peak during the third or fourth year. This trend 
was particularly visible during Republican administrations, suggesting that Republican 
Party may be more inclined to policy manipulation in order to win the re-election process. 
The two authors point out that this cyclical behaviour in the US stock market represents 
an opportunity for investors to potentially benefit from this anomaly. Similar to Santa-
Clara & Valkanov (2003), Wong & McAleer (2009) find that bullish runs in the U.S. 
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stock market tend to take place during Democratic administrations rather than 
Republican. (Wong & McAleer 2009: 3267, 3275-3276.) 
 
Nordhaus (1975) was the first to develop the political business cycle model, according to 
which incumbents try to induce economic prosperity through expansionary policies just 
before the elections in order to gain popularity. The main assumption behind this theory 
is that politicians must deal with a trade-off between unemployment and inflation. 
Expansionary policies, which aim at reducing unemployment and attract voters’ support, 
will result in significant inflation pressure in the post-election period. Restrictive 
measures are then needed in order to curb inflation and are likely to result in recessionary 
trends. To summarize, according to Nordhaus’ model, the incumbents’ term typically 
begins with austerity and ends with abundance and excesses (Wisniewski 2016: 18). 
 
Allvine and O’Neill (1980) examine whether the political business cycle theory is 
reflected in the distribution of U.S stock market returns. According to the authors, since 
1960, U.S. macroeconomic policies have coincided with the election cycle described by 
Nordhaus and the stock market has been mirroring it. During the first two years of the 
terms, equities seem to offer notably low returns compared to the second half of the term. 
Their spectral analysis demonstrates the existence of a 208-week recurring cycle, which 
could offer lucrative trading opportunities for investors who manage to time their 
investments in line with this pattern. (Allvine et al. 1980; Wisniewski 2016: 18.) 
 
In addition, Huang (1985) notes that the annualized return difference between the two 
halves of U.S. presidential terms is over 24% during the 1961-1980 period. Both Hensel 
& Ziemba (1995) and Gärtner & Wellershoff (1995) observe that the political cycle 
impacts firms with small and large capitalization alike, under both Democratic and 
Republican governments. 
 
However, Stovall (1992) and later Booth & Booth (2003) argue that the political cycle 
might be generated by investors’ sentiment rather than actively managed macroeconomic 
policies. According to the authors, the U.S. stock market reflects the deception and 
frustration that is likely to result during the first half of the US presidential term from 
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broken election campaign promises. On the contrary, as the term comes to an end and 
new elections arrive, the market is filled with optimism and hope in anticipation of good 
outcomes. (Booth & Booth 2003: 131-132, 154-155.) 
 
In addition to predictable macroeconomic policies and market sentiment, elections also 
bring new information to investors. Before the elections, investors can only guess who 
will be in charge of deciding and implementing future policies in the medium-term. 
Therefore, election dates and the short-term periods around them are correlated with 
increased public uncertainty, as the U.S president for the next four years is about to be 
elected. However, as the Election Day approaches, the probability of a specific candidate 
winning might increase, thus giving the markets more information about the 
macroeconomic policies likely to be on the agenda during the next presidential mandate. 
According to Wisniewski (2016), Stock market volatility can nevertheless increase in the 
short run because of an election surprise. Some investors, startled by unexpected results, 
adapt their portfolios after the Election day in light of the changes in their expectations. 
This behavior partly explains the bull-run effect, increasing short-term stock price 
fluctuations after the elections (Wisniewski 2016: 18). 
 
Building on previous research that demonstrates a strong correlation between political 
election cycles and periods of great public uncertainty, John W. Goodell and Sami 
Vähämaa (2013) examine the impact this election-induced uncertainty has on stock 
market volatility. The authors study the correlation between five US presidential elections 
between 1992 and 2008 and stock market volatility by regressing monthly percentage 
variations in implied volatility on changes in the likelihood of success of the presidential 
candidate that eventually wins the elections, as a measure of election uncertainty. They 
utilize the VIX index to measure stock market uncertainty and monthly data from the 
Iowa Electronic Markets (IEMs) presidential contracts to measure election uncertainty. 
In essence, IEM presidential contracts are future contracts whose payoffs are based on 
the election outcome, whether the winning candidate is Democratic or Republican. As a 
result, the market price of these contracts can be considered as a solid indication of the 
market’s consensus about the probability of the election winner. (Goodell & Vähämaa 
2013: 1108-1109, 1111,1116). 
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The empirical results of Goodell & Vähämaa (2013) demonstrate that US presidential 
elections create market anxiety and impact stock market volatility. More particularly, they 
reveal a positive correlation between the implied volatility of the S&P 500 index and the 
election probability of the winning candidate, even after controlling for variations in the 
overall election uncertainty.  In other words, their study shows that stock market 
uncertainty increases as the public becomes more certain about the presidential election 
outcome and investors develop and reconsider their expectations about future 
macroeconomic policy. Consequently, these findings also strongly support the political 
uncertainty hypothesis, stating that information about the probability of a specific election 
winner mirrors information about future macroeconomic policy. (Goodell & Vähämaa 
2013: 1108-1109, 1111,1116.) 
 
Specific events that represent inconsistencies in the usual election process also have a 
short-term impact in the domestic stock market. For example, the U.S. Presidential 
Election of 2000 had a distinctive element compared to all the previous ones. For the first 
time in the U.S. modern history, it took more than five weeks for a winner to officially 
emerge. U.S citizens went to the polls on November 7, 2000, to elect their 43th President. 
While the final results would normally be announced by the end of the following day the 
latest, George W. Bush didn’t emerge as a clear winner until December 13th the same 
year. Based on previous research proving a correlation between U.S. presidential 
elections and stock market performance, as well as on existing literature indicating that 
one-time occurrences affect financial markets, Nippani and Medlin (2002) examine the 
effect that the late declaration of the U.S. Presidential Election winner had on the stock 
markets at the end of 2000. 
 
Nippani et al. (2002) use a conventional t-test to study the impact of this unique event on 
three most popular stock market indices: Standard and Poor’s 500 (S&P 500), the Dow 
Jones Industrials Average (DJI) and the NASDAQ Composite Index. In addition, the 
authors also conduct a multiple regression analysis that controls for interest rate 
movements. The empirical results of their research demonstrate a significant initial 
negative reaction from the stock markets to the late election results. The market reacted 
negatively to the delay, but only in the very short term, more exactly during the first four 
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trading days after the election. As a result, this study also supports the efficient market 
hypothesis, explained later in this paper, as the market already adjusted for the unique 
event by the end of the first event window studied by the authors, from November 8th to 
November 13th, 2000. (Nippani & Medlin 2002: 162-163, 168.) 
 
 
c. International markets  
 
As explained in this chapter, there is an extensive body of literature that studies and 
demonstrates the impact U.S presidential elections have on their domestic stock market. 
However, the U.S is a powerful global player, whose influence plays a noticeable part in 
shaping the course of world events. As a result, research has also been undertaken to study 
the impact U.S presidential elections might have on foreign stock markets.  
 
Foerster & Schmitz (1997) examine the international pervasiveness and importance of 
the previously discovered four-year U.S. election cycle. The authors find that the election 
cycle is an important factor in forecasting not only American, but also international stock 
returns. In all 18 countries that are examined over the period of 1957 to 1996, returns in 
year two are lower than any of the other years, being negative in most countries. In 
addition, the authors find that the U.S. dollar depreciates more in year two of the election 
cycle. (Foerster & Schmitz 1997: 1, 21-23). 
 
According to Foerster et al. (1997), the U.S. election cycle variable may be capturing 
some form of international and U.S. market sentiment, and if that is the case, the election 
cycle may be an important non-diversifiable political factor in determining international 
conditional expected stock returns. In this case, it could be beneficial for investors to 
avoid holding international equity investments in the second year of the U.S. election 
cycle. This type of investment strategy might dominate the buy-and-hold alternative. 
(Foerster & Schmitz 1997: 1, 21-23). 
 
More recently, Hung (2013) focuses on the U.S. Presidential elections and the Taiwanese 
stock market. The author uses monthly stock market returns to measure the election cycle 
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effect. To measure the bull-run effect, Hung (2013) calculates abnormal returns using the 
event-study method.  
 
Hung (2013) finds that it is hard to say whether the U.S. election cycle affects the 
Taiwanese stock market from an analysis of the Taiwanese stock market in the aftermath 
of U.S. presidential elections. The author also finds that U.S. presidential elections have 
no bull-run election effect on the Taiwanese stock market. According to the CARs 
calculated for the eleven event windows of each election, three of the five significant 
CARs were negative, which means the Taiwanese stock market has no consistent reaction 
to the results of U.S. presidential elections. A bull-run effect usually refers to positive 
reactions of the stock market in the event windows of elections. However, most studies 
that support this hypothesis examine only the relationship between domestic elections and 
the domestic market. The result of Hung’s study implies that a bull-run election effect 
might not exist in an international case. Lastly, the author finds no evidence to support a 
party effect in the monthly returns in accordance with a particular U.S. presidential 
election between 1980 and 2008. (Hung 2013.) 
 
 
27 
 
 
3. EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS 
The event study methodology suits our research objective because of its ability to identify 
abnormal changes in asset prices. This is because it is based on the overall assessment of 
a huge number of investors, analysts and other parties who quickly process all available 
information to asses each individual company’s market value (Chen 2004: 351). 
 
The event study methodology is closely linked to the efficient market hypothesis (EHM), 
introduced by Eugene Fama (1970). The EMH is a financial theory which suggests that 
securities markets are extremely efficient in incorporating all available information in 
asset prices and, therefore, stocks always trade at their “fair” value. This implies that it is 
impossible for investors to find undervalued stocks or sell stocks for inflated prices, even 
with tools such as technical analysis of fundamental analysis. The efficient market 
hypothesis was originally introduced by Eugene Fama in 1970, and it has since been one 
of the cornerstones of modern finance theory. (Fama 1970: 383-384; 413-414.) However, 
the EMH has also received a fair share of criticism and a substantial body of contradicting 
empirical evidence exists. For example, investors such as Warren Buffet have managed 
to consistently beat the market for extended periods of time, which should not be possible 
according to the EMH. 
 
Fama (1970) introduces three sufficient conditions for capital market efficiency. The first 
one is the absence of transaction costs in trading securities. The second condition is total 
information symmetry, meaning that market participants can access all available 
information free of charge. Lastly, market participants agree on the implications currently 
available information has on the current and future price of assets. In such a case, the 
price of a security would perfectly reflect all information available. In the real world, 
however, there are both transaction costs and information asymmetries. Luckily, the 
aforementioned conditions are sufficient but not necessary for market efficiency. When 
limited, transaction costs, information asymmetry and disagreement among market 
participants do not automatically imply market inefficiency, even though they are 
potential sources of it. For example, transaction costs might reduce the flow of 
transactions. However, it does not mean that prices of the transactions that take place do 
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not fully reflect available information. Similarly, capital markets may still be efficient 
despite some level of information asymmetry, as long  as a sufficient number of investors 
can freely access information. Disagreements between investors regarding the 
implications of available information do not necessarily imply market inefficiency either, 
expect if there are investors who can consistently interpret available information better 
than what is implied in market prices. (Fama 1970: 387-388.) 
 
The efficient market hypothesis can be divided in three forms, based on Fama’s (1970) 
categorization of  empirical tests. These forms are “weak-form”, “semi-strong-form” and 
“strong-form”. The weak-form EMH suggests that all past information, i.e. all the data of 
past prices,  is priced into securities. Therefore, no form of technical analysis can be used 
to help investors make investment decisions based on historical patterns. However, if the 
weak-form EMH is believed, fundamental analysis could be used to discover undervalued 
or overvalued stocks. With fundamental analysis, one tries to find the intrinsic value of a 
security by analysing various aspects that could have an impact on the value, such as 
financial factors (e.g. company balance sheet and profit & loss statement), 
macroeconomic factors and microeconomic factors. The goal is then to buy undervalued 
stocks and sell (or short sell) overvalued stocks to gain higher profits than the market 
average. (Fama 1970, Ziliotto & Serati 2015: 414-417.) 
 
Semi-strong-form EMF, on the other hand, is based on the belief that all publicly available 
information, both historical and current, is already incorporated into asset prices. Any 
new information that arises is also immediately priced into securities. Therefore, neither 
technical nor fundamental analysis can be utilized to gain higher returns. According to 
the semi-strong EMF, only information that is not available to the public (i.e. insider 
information) can give investors and advantage on the market. (Fama 1970, Ziliotto & 
Serati 2015: 414-417.) 
 
Lastly, the strong-form EMF states that all information, both publicly available and 
private, is incorporated into asset prices. Thus, no type of information or analysis can give 
investors an advantage on the market. (Fama 1970.) If the strong form is believed, active 
stock investing would be a waste of time and resources, and investors were better off 
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simply investing in the market index (e.g. ETFs). However, there are multiple anomalies 
that the EMH cannot explain, and even contradict the theory.  
 
In their paper, Ziliotto and Serati (2015) list four important market anomalies. The first 
one is the “small size-companies effect”, according to which returns on small businesses’ 
shares are consistently higher than equilibrium returns due to liquidity issues. The second 
anomaly is called the “January effect”. Research demonstrates that the general selling 
pressure is particularly high in December every year, before getting back to normal levels 
in January, because of investors looking for tax savings.  The third effect challenging 
market efficiency is an excessive volatility in the short term. Market prices tend to react 
excessively to external shocks, including macroeconomic announcements and corporate 
news. Despite quick readjustments afterwards, this over-reaction is incompatible with the 
original definition of market efficiency. The last remark is about mean reversion: even 
after substantial fluctuations, market prices tend to revert to their long-term equilibrium 
values. This contradicts the behavior hypothesized by the random walk theory. (Ziliotto 
& Serati 2015: 416.) 
 
According to Fama (1970), the argument behind the EMF, i.e. that in efficient markets 
prices fully reflect all available information, is so generalized that it has no implications 
which could be empirically tested. To make the model testable, the price formation 
process needs to be specified more exactly. It is also necessary to define more precisely 
what is meant by the expression “fully reflect”. In his paper, Fama (1970) proposes three 
different types of models to empirically test market efficiency. First, the expected return 
or “fair game” models. Secondly, the submartingale model and lastly, the random walk 
model. 
 
Regarding the fair game models, Fama (1970) argues that most of the available work on 
capital market efficiency assumes that the conditions of market equilibrium can be stated 
in terms of expected returns. According to Fama (1970), the expected return of a security 
is a function of its own “risk”, and that different theories vary mainly in how risk is 
defined. However, all models that fall under the class of expected return theories, can be 
described with the following notation: 
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(1)                𝐸 (?̃?𝑗,𝑡+1 | Φ𝑡) = [1 + 𝐸(?̃?𝑗,𝑡+1 | Φ𝑡)]𝑝𝑗𝑡 
 
where E is the expected value operator, p𝑗𝑡 is the price of security j at time t, p𝑗,𝑡+1 is the 
price at t+1 and r𝑗,𝑡+1 is the one-period percentage return which can be calculated from 
p𝑗,𝑡+1−p𝑗𝑡
p𝑗𝑡
.  Φ𝑡 is a general symbol representing whatever information is assumed to be 
fully reflected in the price at time t. The tildes indicate that r𝑗,𝑡+1 and p𝑗,𝑡+1 are random 
variables at t. 
 
Fama (1970) illustrates the relationship between expected and realized returns with the 
following notations: 
 
(2)                ?̃?𝑗,𝑡+1 = 𝑟𝑗,𝑡+1 − 𝐸(?̃?𝑗,𝑡+1 | Φ𝑡) 
 
(3)                𝐸(?̃?𝑗,𝑡+1 | Φ𝑡) = 0 
 
Where ?̃?𝑗,𝑡+1 denotes the excess return of security j at t+1. Equation (3) states that the 
sequence ?̃?𝑗,𝑡+1 is a pure “fair game” in respect to information set  Φ𝑡, meaning that the 
expected return of every “player” is zero. Thus, all investors are in an equal position 
regarding information. 
 
Next, Fama (1970) introduces the Sub-martingale Model.  
 
(4)                𝐸(𝑝𝑗,𝑡+1 | Φ𝑡) ≥  𝑝𝑡𝑗   
 
According to Fama, the price sequence 𝑝𝑡𝑗 for security j follows a sub-martingale in 
respect to the information sequence  Φ𝑡. This means that the expected value of next 
period’s price, which is based on available information, is equal to or greater than the 
current price. The sub-martingale model has one important empirical implication 
concerning the EMH, which is that based only on information  Φ𝑡, it is not possible to 
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gain greater expected returns by mechanical trading rules compared to the buy-and-hold 
strategy over the future period in question. (Fama 1970: 386.) 
 
Lastly, Fama introduces the Random Walk Model. In early research, the argument that 
current security prices fully reflect all available information was assumed to indicate that 
successive price changes are independent. It was also assumed that consecutive price 
changes are identically distributed. Together, these two hypotheses constitute the random 
walk model. The same can be noted as follows: 
 
(5)                𝑓(𝑟𝑗,𝑡+1 | Φ𝑡) = 𝑓(𝑟𝑗,𝑡+1)  
 
This equation states that the conditional and marginal probability distributions of an 
independent random variable are identical. Also, the density function f must be same for 
all t. Fama (1970) argues that the random walk model is essentially an extension of the 
more general expected return or fair game model, the random walk model including a 
more detailed expression regarding the economic environment.  
 
Figure 1. Efficient vs inefficient market reaction. (after Knüpfer & Puttonen 
2014: 166.) 
 
Figure 1 illustrates a market’s reaction to a positive announcement or event. In efficient 
markets, the news is incorporated accurately and without delay, causing the security price 
to jump immediately to the “right” level. If the markets are not efficient, however, the 
Cumulative return
Time
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new information is absorbed into security prices with a delay and it takes time to reach 
the right price level. (Knüpfer & Puttonen 2014: 166.) 
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4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
An event study is a methodology which can be used to measure the relationship between 
an event that has an impact on securities and the returns of those securities. The event 
study methodology focuses on identifying abnormal returns on securities around a 
specific event. This event can be for example a regulatory change, a natural disaster, or 
in our case, presidential elections. If the markets react favourably to an event, positive 
abnormal returns can be expected around the event date. If the market reaction is negative, 
on the other hand, negative abnormal returns can be expected. Therefore, when stock 
market indices are analysed, abnormal returns provide a way to assess the market’s (or a 
specific sector’s) reaction to different events. (Chen & Siems 2004: 351-352.) 
4.1. Event Study Methodology 
To examine the market’s reaction to US Presidential elections, we use the event study 
methodology. The event study methodology is a widely used statistical approach to 
market based empirical research in accounting and finance. The main purpose of this type 
of studies is to analyse the behaviour of security prices around the time of an event or an 
information announcement. The event study approach has been used to examine a large 
variety of different events, such as announcements of annual earnings, large block trades, 
corporate mergers, political events and terrorist attacks. (Bowman 1983: 561-562.) 
 
The event study methodology has its roots in studies conducted by Ball & Brown (1968) 
and Fama, Fisher, Jensen & Roll (1969). Ball & Brown examined the reaction of security 
prices to the unanticipated component of annual earnings announcements. The authors 
found that the security prices already reflected approximately 85 to 90 percent of the 
information contained in the annual earnings report before the announcement date. These 
results were initially regarded as concerning, but it later became clear that the markets’ 
fairly accurate earnings estimates were a result of utilizing various sources such as interim 
earnings reports and other publicly available information. Therefore, annual accounting 
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earnings reports served merely to revise previous estimates. (Ball & Brown 1968: ; 
Bowman 1983: 561-562.) 
 
The term event can be interpreted rather broadly. Early research was mainly focused on 
announcements as events. Usually those announcements were coming from companies 
directly, such as earnings announcements or stock splits. However, later studies have also 
examined announcements from outside the companies, such as regulatory changes or 
announcements from an accounting standard body, as well as other types of more general 
“happenings”, such as natural disasters, terrorist attacks or political elections. The body 
of event study literature, both in terms of specific technique choices available and 
different topics that have been covered, is extensive. However, the basic structure of event 
studies is relatively straightforward.  In its simplest form, an event study includes the 
following five steps. (Bowman 1983: 561-563.) 
 
1. Identifying and specifying the event of interest 
2. Modelling the security price reaction 
3. Estimating the abnormal returns 
4. Organizing and grouping the abnormal returns 
5. Analysing the results 
 
The first step in conducting an event study is to define the event of interest and identify 
the event window or windows. The event window refers to the period of time over which 
the security prices of the companies or indices involved in the study are examined. The 
event window generally consists of at least the event day and the day after the 
announcement. This allows the researcher to capture price effects of announcements that 
take place after the stock market has closed on the announcement day. In practice, 
however, the event window is usually expanded to multiple days or several event 
windows are chosen, enabling closer examination of periods surrounding the event. 
(MacKinlay 1997: 14-15.) 
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Figure 2. Timeline of an event study. (after Benninga 2014: 332.) 
 
Even though it is somewhat obvious, identifying the event is a crucial step in several 
ways. Firstly, the choice of an event determines the possible hypotheses that can be tested 
in a meaningful way. It is also important to decide whether one investigates the impact of 
a single event or a type of event (e.g. one presidential election or presidential elections 
overall). Generally speaking, a study of an event type yields more robust results than a 
study of a single event. This is because a study of an individual event can more easily be 
influenced by cofounding events, errors in ascertaining the timing of the event and other 
exogenous factors. When investigating a type of event, the sample size is larger and 
distributed between different calendar times. Therefore, when the target of the study is a 
single event, it is important to control for cofounding events and other exogenous 
influences. (Bowman 1983: 563-564; MacKinlay 1997: 13-15.) 
 
The next step after identifying and defining the event and event window is to estimate the 
security price reaction to the event and create research hypotheses. In some cases, the 
price reaction is expected to be in the same direction for all companies that are studied. 
For example, one could hypothesize that companies which announce a decrease in 
dividends will face negative security price reactions. In another possible scenario, one 
might expect all studied companies to react in the same direction without making a 
prediction regarding what the direction might be. For example, it could be hypothesized 
that all bidder companies in a merger will be affected similarly by the announcement of 
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the merger proposal, but the data will indicate the direction of the effect. (Bowman 1983: 
565.) 
 
In many studies, however, one expects the direction of the reaction to vary between 
different companies and the direction to be determined by the information relevant to the 
event. Therefore, a model is created to divide companies into expected negative and 
positive price reactions. According to Bowman (1983), it can be analytically 
hypothesized that: 
 
(6)                 𝐸(𝑒𝑖𝑡 |η, 𝑦𝑖𝑡) ≠ 𝐸(𝑒𝑡𝑗) = 0   
 
where  𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the measure of excess returns for company i in time period t; 𝜂 is the 
expectations model and 𝑦𝑖𝑡 describes information from 𝜂 for firm i at time t. 
 
The third step in conducting an event study is to choose the method that is used to estimate 
the excess returns, also known as abnormal returns, for the companies, portfolios or 
indices that are examined. There are several options available. The most common ones 
can be categorized as unadjusted or mean adjusted returns and risk adjusted returns 
models. (Bowman 1983: 567.) 
 
The first category was developed and commonly used in research before risk adjustment 
procedures became available. With the unadjusted approach, one simply defines the 
realized return as the excess return of the security, thus assuming that the expect return is 
zero. The mean adjusted approach, on the other hand, defines the expected return of a 
security as the mean of its past returns over some predefined period. The abnormal return 
is then calculated by deducting the expected return from the realized return. Both of these 
methods appear rather simplistic compared to more detailed and complex methods that 
have been developed more recently. However, Brown & Warner (1980) found that the 
mean adjusted returns measure, despite being computationally much simpler, was very 
robust and even outperformed the more elaborate methods under many conditions. Even 
nowadays, the mean adjusted returns method is a valid tool in many event studies. 
(Bowman 1983: 567.) 
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The second category is the risk adjusted returns approach. The most famous of these is 
the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), based on which most of the other methods in 
this group have been developed. The CAPM, introduced by Sharpe (1964), Lintner 
(1965a and 1965b) and Mossin (1966), is a model that can be used to determine the 
theoretical price (i.e. the expected return) of an asset. The CAPM formula is as follows: 
 
(7)                𝐸(𝑟𝑖) = 𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽𝑖[𝐸(𝑟𝑚) − 𝑟𝑓] 
 
where 𝐸(𝑟𝑖) is the expected return of asset i, 𝑟𝑓 is the risk-free rate of return, 𝛽𝑖 is the beta 
of asset i (firm-specific risk measure) and 𝐸(𝑟𝑚) is the expected return of the market 
portfolio.  
 
The most commonly used risk adjusted approach is the market model, which is basically 
a regression of the firm’s stock returns and the returns of the market index. The market 
model can be illustrated as follows: 
 
(8)                𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑡 
 
where 𝑟𝑖𝑡 is the return of stock i on day t and 𝑟𝑚𝑡 the market return on day t. Coefficients 
𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖 are estimated by running an ordinary least square (OLS) regression over the 
estimation window. (Benninga 2014: 333-334.) 
 
When choosing the market and/or industry indices used in the study, it is important to 
make sure that the data is available. Generally speaking, a market index should be a broad-
based value weighted index or a float weighted index. The industry index, on the other 
hand, should be corresponding and relevant for the firm that is being studied. (Benninga 
2014: 333-334.) Since the abnormal return of an asset is defined as the difference between  
the asset’s realized return and its expected return, it can be de deducted from equation (8) 
that: 
 
(9)                𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑟𝑖𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑡) 
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where 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the abnormal return for asset i at time t, 𝑟𝑖𝑡 is the realized return of asset i 
at time t and (𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑡) is the return predicted by the asset’s 𝛼, 𝛽 and market return. 
The abnormal returns during the event window are then interpreted as a measure of the 
event’s impact on the value of the security.  
 
Another popular risk adjustment methodology is the two-factor model. This model is 
similar to the market model, but in addition to using market returns, the two-factor model 
also utilizes industry returns in computing the asset’s expected returns. In the two-factor 
model, the asset’s expected return is calculated by regressing the asset’s realized returns 
against both market and industry returns during the estimation window. This can be 
illustrated with the following notation: 
 
(10)                𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑚𝑡𝛽𝑖,𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑟𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦,𝑡 
 
where 𝑟𝑖𝑡 is the return of stock i on day t, 𝑟𝑚𝑡 the market return on day t and 𝑟𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦,𝑡 
the industry return (e.g. an industry index) on day t. Coefficients 𝛼𝑖, 𝛽𝑖,𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 and 
𝛽𝑖,𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 are estimated by running an ordinary least square (OLS) regression over the 
estimation window. The industry returns are included in the model to take into account 
industry-specific information in addition to the market-wide data. (Benninga 2014: 333-
334; 351.) Other models that include even more factors exist as well, but according to 
MacKinlay (1997), the benefits of using such multifactor models are limited and the 
reduction in the variance of the abnormal returns is small. 
 
When the abnormal returns have been calculated, these returns need to be organized and 
grouped. A researcher may want to, for example, group companies into portfolios based 
on the expected security price reaction which was discussed in step two. In addition, 
individual abnormal returns need to be aggregated over the event window. The most 
common method for this is to calculate the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs). This 
is an arithmetic procedure - the formula is displayed later (formula 13). (Bowman: 569-
570.) 
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The last step in conducting an event study is analysing and interpreting the findings. After 
the abnormal returns or cumulative abnormal returns have been computed, the null 
hypothesis (i.e. that the event had no effect on the asset prices) must be tested. According 
to Bowman (1983), it might be sufficient or even necessary in some cases to simply use 
descriptive statistics. However, without the use of statistical tests, the sample size needs 
to be large and the abnormal returns substantial.  
 
Several nonparametric statistical tests have been used in past literature, including the sign 
test, the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test, the binomial test, the Kolmogorov-
Smimov one-sample test and the Marm-Whitney U test. The choice depends on the data 
used and the setting of the research in general. Parametric measures have also been 
employed in event studies, even though there are some potential issues related to meeting 
the necessary assumptions, for example excess returns being independently distributed 
(see e.g. Bowman 1983 for further information). However, Brown & Warner (1980) 
found that t-tests on data that was transformed to approximate identically and 
independently distributed returns yielded promising results. (Bowman 1983: 570-573.) 
 
The goal of this paper is to examine how capital markets, especially stock markets, react 
to U.S. presidential elections. In order to do this, an event study methodology is applied 
to several major indices from the U.S., Europe and Asia to see the elections’ possible 
effect on both domestic and world markets. To measure the abnormal performance of the 
indices selected for this study, the excess returns approach, described by Brown and 
Warner (1985), is followed. This approach was also described and used by Chen & Siems 
(2004) to study the impact of terrorist attacks on capital markets. The goal is to measure 
the index returns following the elections and then examine how those returns differ from 
past averages. This allows to statistically test the significance of the elections to stock 
markets. 
 
For each index, daily abnormal returns are computed on the event day, preceding days 
and the following days: 
 
(11)                AR(t) = 𝑅(𝑡) − 𝐸𝑟 
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(12)                𝐸(𝑅) = 1/200 ∑ 𝑅(𝑡)−11𝑡= −210  
 
Where AR is the abnormal return at time t, R is the actual return at time t and E(R) is the 
expected return based on the estimation period (-210, -11). For each day, the expected 
return (formula 12) is subtracted from the actual returns. To estimate the expected return, 
a 200-day estimation period from t = -210 to t = -11 is used, leaving a 10-day gap between 
the estimation period and the event day t = 0. This is to prevent election induced 
uncertainty from affecting the expected returns. 
 
Three event windows are examined: t=-2 to +2, t=+5 and t=+10. The first event window 
is meant to capture both pre-election behaviour as well as the initial market reaction, but 
two longer event windows are also examined in order to see how quickly and well the 
markets digested the news. In some cases, the emergence of new information reduces 
uncertainty and thus, market volatility, whereas in other cases the markets struggle to 
ascertain the impact of this new information, causing the uncertainty to persist even after 
the news. For all three event windows, cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are 
computed: 
 
(13)                CAR𝑡 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑇1+𝑗
𝑡
𝑗=1  
 
Where CAR𝑡 is the sum of all abnormal returns from the beginning of an event window 
T1 until day t in the window. The CARs are presented in chapter five. 
 
As mentioned, the null hypothesis is that there are no abnormal returns around or 
following the elections. Therefore, the aim is to test H0 : CAR𝑡 = 0. The test statistic for 
this is computed as follows: 
 
(14)                t =
𝐶𝐴𝑅
𝑆.𝐸.
~𝑡𝐿−2 
 
This test statistic follows a t distribution with L-2 degrees of freedom. L = 𝑇1 − 𝑇0 and 
S.E. is calculated as the standard deviations of ARs during the event window. If the t-
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statistic values are statistically significant, it suggests that U.S. presidential elections are 
perceived as an influential event and that they can explain stock market price movements 
during the observation period around the elections. This method was also described and 
utilized by Chien & Siems (2004). The abnormal returns around the elections are also 
presented graphically to illustrate market movements around the elections. 
4.2. Data 
For this study, daily price data from S&P500, Dow Jones Industrial Average, NASDAQ 
Composite, EUROSTOXX 5O, Nikkei 225 and Hang Seng indices are used. Daily 
observations allow to compute cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the selected 
event windows. In this study, U.S. presidential elections from 2000 to 2016 are studied. 
A special focus is placed on the latest presidential elections. This is because the 2016 
elections when Donald Trump was elected as the President of the United States were very 
tight and somewhat controversial and might therefore reveal some interesting findings 
about how global markets reacted to the outcome. The elections from 2000 to 2016 are 
selected because the era of digitalisation, social media and the internet in general, might 
have an impact on how investors react to political events, such as presidential elections. 
In addition, more recent elections have been studied less than the once that took place 
longer ago. Lastly, previous literature is analysed and compared to the results of this study 
in order to see how markets have reacted to the elections in the past, and if there is a 
difference between the digital era and previous elections. 
 
In addition, three different industries are examined around the 2016 elections. These 
industries are aerospace & defence, financial services and healthcare. These industries 
were chosen because it is hypothesized that the party of the president and the policies that 
come with it have an especially strong effect on these industries. The hypothesis is that 
these three industries would prefer Republicans, due to the Republican party’s habits of 
posing less regulations to companies. Aerospace & defence, financial services and 
healthcare are all industries which are sensitive to government policies and regulation. 
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5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The empirical findings of the study are presented and analysed in this chapter. First, the 
results from the 2016 U.S. presidential elections are presented. The focus is in major stock 
indices, namely the S&P 500, Dow Jones Industrial Average, NASDAQ Composite, 
EUROSTOXX 5O, Nikkei 225 and Hang Seng indices. A closer look to certain industries 
that might be especially affected by the election result is then taken. The results for U.S. 
presidential elections from 2000 to 2012 are then presented and discussed as well. 
Moreover, the findings of this study are compared to previous findings. 
5.1. 2016 U.S. Presidential Elections 
Table 1. Abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns for six major world indices 
around the 2016 U.S. Presidential Elections. The event date is 09.11.2016. 
Indices/Markets 
Event-day 
AR 
T =  -2 to +2 
CAR 
6-day CAR 11-day CAR 
S&P 500 1.05 3.46*** 1.41*** 2.41*** 
 
(0.85) (0.83) (0.47) (0.42) 
Dow Jones Industrial 1.34 4.97*** 2.57*** 3.45*** 
 
(0.82) (0.67) (0.60) (0.48) 
NASDAQ Composite 1.04 3.38*** 1.54** 2.82*** 
 
(1.03) (1.02) (0.71) (0.60) 
EURO STOXX 50 1.08 2.50***  0.07 0.25 
 
(1.51) (0.88) (0.63) (0.57) 
Hang Seng Index -2.23* -0.74 -3.08** -1.57 
 (1.24) (1.47) (1.35) (1.14) 
Nikkei 225 -5.48*** 2.89 4.13 6.88*** 
 
(1.75) (3.84) (3.52) (2.61) 
 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 1 presents the abnormal returns for six major world indices on their first trading 
day after the result of the 2016 elections was known, which was the 9th of November 
2016. In addition, the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the T = -2 to +2, 6-day 
and 11-day event windows following the 9th of November are presented. Figure 3 shows 
the daily abnormal returns over the window from T = -10 to T = +10. 
 
Two observations can be made right away. Firstly, all U.S. indices behaved somewhat 
similarly around the 2016 elections. The S&P 500, Dow Jones and Nasdaq indices all 
experienced positive abnormal returns on their first trading day after the election results 
were published. Furthermore, all three U.S. indices experienced statistically significant 
positive CARs over all three event windows (all at the 1% level expect Nasdaq 6-Day 
CAR at the 5% level). These findings imply that the 2016 elections had a significant short-
term impact on the U.S. stock markets, and that the markets perceived Donald Trump’s 
victory as positive news. These results also resonate with Wisniewski’s (2016) theory 
about the impact unexpected electoral results can have on stock market volatility. As 
explained previously, Donald Trump’s victory came as a surprise for everyone, including 
the media, the general public and the markets. As a result, investors may have adapted 
their portfolios the day following the results announcement, thus participating in the 
observed bull-run effect. 
 
Secondly, world stock markets seemed to have mixed reactions to the elections. The 
EUROSTOXX 50 index exhibited an initial positive reaction on the event day. The T=-2 
to +2 event window CAR was also positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
However, the CARs for both 6 and 11-day event windows were close to zero and 
statistically insignificant. This could imply that European stock markets reacted 
positively to the election result, or that European markets simply followed the same trend 
as U.S. markets did. The Asian markets had mixed reactions as well. The Hang Seng 
Index experienced negative abnormal returns on the event day and throughout all three 
event windows. However, only the event-day AR was statistically significant at the 10% 
level and the 6-day CAR at the 5% level. The Hang Seng index exhibited large 
fluctuations both before and after the elections. After the -2.23% AR on the event day, 
the Hang Seng had a 1.82% positive AR the day after and a -1.41 AR the day after that. 
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Therefore, it is hard to draw conclusions about the potential effects the elections had on 
the Hang Seng index. Nikkei 225 index also experienced a large statistically significant 
negative abnormal return on the event day (-5.48% AR). However, the T=-2 to +2 and 6-
day CARs were both positive and statistically insignificant. The 11-day CAR was positive 
and statistically significant at the 1% level. After the initial big drop, the Nikkei 225 
bounced right back the day after with a 6.51% positive AR.  
 
Overall, the evidence indicates that Asian markets had a negative initial reaction, but it 
did not persist for long. Therefore, drawing any definite conclusions regarding the world 
stock market reaction to the 2016 elections would be difficult. This is consistent with 
previous literature and research. While some academics managed to demonstrate the 
international pervasiveness of the 4-years U.S. election cycle (see e.g. Foerster & Schmitz 
1997), Hung  (2013) concludes his research with a lack of evidence supporting the 
existence of either a party effect or a bull-run effect on international stock markets. 
Similarly, these results are too ambiguous to determine a specific correlation between U.S 
presidential election results and short-term stock market performance in international 
cases.    
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Figure 3. Daily abnormal returns around the 2016 U.S. Presidential Elections for six 
major world stock indices. 
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Figure 4. Daily abnormal returns around the 2016 U.S. Presidential Elections - U.S. 
Indices vs World Indices. 
 
Since the traditional view is that the Republicans allow markets to operate more freely 
and tend to impose less regulations and restrictions to companies than the Democrats, 
different industries might react differently to the presidential elections. To test this 
hypothesis, three industry indices are examined around the 2016 elections. These 
industries are aerospace & defence, healthcare and financial services. The hypothesis is 
that since all these industries theoretically benefit from less regulation, they should prefer 
a Republican victory. 
 
Table 2. Abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns of three US industry indices 
around the 2016 U.S. Presidential Elections. The event date is 09.11.2016. 
Indices/Markets 
Event-day 
AR 
T=  -2 to +2 
CAR 
6-day CAR 11-day CAR 
Aerospace & Defense 4.85*** 9.84*** 8.10*** 10.08*** 
 
(1.03) (1.60) (1.80) (1.46) 
Healthcare 3.44*** 6.31*** 3.11** 1.99 
 
(0.99) (1.63) (1.50) (1.30) 
Financial Services 3.98* 9.68*** 7.84*** 9.26*** 
 
(2.22) (1.69) (2.05) (1.63) 
 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 
47 
 
 
Table 2 presents the abnormal returns for aerospace & defence, healthcare and financial 
services sectors on their first trading day after the elections. CARs for the T = -2 to +2, 
6-day and 11-day event windows are also presented. Figure 5 illustrates the daily 
abnormal returns for these industries over the window from T = -10 to T = +10. The 
results show that all three industry indices exhibited statistically significant strong gains 
on their first trading day after the elections. The aerospace & defense index had a 4.85% 
abnormal return, healthcare index a 3.44% AR and the financial services index a 3.98% 
AR. In addition, both aerospace & defense and financial services indices experienced 
statistically significant positive CARs throughout all three event windows at the 1% 
significance level. Healthcare industry also had a strong positive initial reaction, and the 
T = -2 to +2 and 6-day CARs are positive and statistically significant as well (at the 1% 
and 5% levels, respectfully). All in all, the results strongly suggest that government policy 
and regulation-sensitive industries such as aerospace & defense, healthcare and financial 
services were impacted by the 2016 election result and that these industries saw Donald 
Trump’s victory as a positive surprise. 
 
 
Figure 5. Daily abnormal returns around the 2016 U.S. Presidential Elections – Three 
U.S. industry indices. 
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Figure 6. VIX Index around the 2016. U.S. presidential elections. 
 
As Figure 6 illustrates, market uncertainty (the VIX index is a common measure of market 
uncertainty) increased substantially prior to the Election Day. However, when the election 
result was published, market uncertainty decreased sharply and even went below the 
levels 10 days before the elections.  
 
This is consistent with the empirical results of Goodell & Vähämaa (2013), who studied 
the correlation between the U.S presidential elections and stock market volatility between 
1992 and 2008. They demonstrated that stock market uncertainty increases as the Election 
Day approaches. Investors, who become more certain about the election results, develop 
expectations about future macroeconomic policies and adapt their portfolio accordingly. 
The VIX Index mirrors this behaviour around the 2016 U.S. presidential elections as well. 
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5.2. 2012 U.S. Presidential Elections 
 
Table 3. Abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns for six major world indices 
around the 2012 U.S. Presidential Elections. The event date is 07.11.2012. 
Indices/Markets 
Event-day 
AR 
T=  -2 to +2 
CAR 
6-day CAR 11-day CAR 
S&P 500 -2.46*** -2.74** -5.58*** -3.27*** 
 
(0.80) (1.16) (0.90) (1.08) 
Dow Jones Industrial -2.43*** -2.32** -5.44*** -3.53*** 
 
(0.73) (1.16) (0.86) (1.00) 
NASDAQ Composite -2.57*** -2.92** -5.99*** -3.53*** 
 
(0.95) (1.23) (0.94) (1.17) 
EURO STOXX 50 -2.31* -2.88*** -2.76*** -1.09 
 
(1.39) (1.06) (0.95) (1.23) 
Hang Seng Index 0.62 -3.76*** -2.81** -2.84*** 
 (1.09) (1.02) (1.23) (1.14) 
Nikkei 225 -0.06 -3.45*** -3.07*** 2.39** 
 
(1.03) (0.52) (0.57) (1.15) 
 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
Table 3 presents the abnormal returns for six major world indices on their first trading 
day after the 2012 elections, which was the 7th of November 2012. In addition, the CARs 
for the T = -2 to +2, 6-day and 11-day event windows following the 7th of November are 
presented. Figure 8 illustrates the daily abnormal returns over the window from T = -10 
to T = +10. 
 
All three U.S. indices experienced a relatively large and statistically significant negative 
abnormal return at the 1% level on their first trading day after the 2012 elections (around 
-2.5% per index). The CARs were also negative and statistically significant throughout 
all three event windows (at the 5% level for T=-2 to +2 and 1% level for the 6-day and 
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11-day event windows). All three U.S. indices examined behaved very similarly in terms 
of abnormal returns, which can be seen from figure 7. Therefore, diversifying across 
different U.S. indices did not seem to offer any advantages around the 2012 elections. 
These findings suggest that the 2012 elections had a significant short-term effect on the 
U.S. stock markets, and that Barack Obama’s victory was not regarded as positive news 
for investors. However, it should be noted that during the time, the markets were also 
worried about the approach of the so-called fiscal cliff, which would potentially have 
massive implications on government spending and taxation. The markets anticipated that 
the democratic victory might mean bigger tax increases and more cuts in defense budgets 
and other government expenditure. This most likely played a big role in the market drops 
that were seen after it became clear that Obama and the Democrats would rule the white 
house for another four years. This resonates with previous literature on both the political 
business cycle theory and market sentiment around presidential elections. Markets were 
expecting restrictive macroeconomic policies to take place during the forthcoming 
Democratic mandate, thus resulting in negative abnormal returns in domestic stock 
market indices.  
 
 
Figure 7. Daily abnormal returns around the 2012 U.S. Presidential Elections - U.S. 
Indices vs World Indices. 
 
European markets experienced somewhat similar abnormal returns than their U.S. 
counterparts, but at least partly for different reasons. The EUROSTOXX 50 index 
exhibited a -2.31% abnormal return on its first trading day after the 2012 elections. The 
CARs were also negative on all three event windows (statistically significant on the T = 
-2 to +2 and 6-day event windows at the 1% level). However, the markets received some 
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worrying economic data regarding the Eurozone and especially Germany the same day, 
which contributed to the poor performance of European markets. 
 
 
Figure 8. Daily abnormal returns around the 2012 U.S. Presidential Elections for six 
major world stock indices. 
 
Asian indices were relatively volatile around the 2012 elections. Neither Hang Seng nor 
Nikkei 225 had a big swing on their first trading day after the elections. However, Hang 
Seng’s CARs were negative and statistically significant for all three event windows. 
Nikkei 225, on the other hand, experienced negative and statistically significant CARs 
during the T = -2 to +2 and 6-day event windows at the 1% level. During the second half 
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of the event window, the ARs turned positive leaving the 11-day CAR positive and 
statistically significant at the 5% level. As can be seen from figure 6, almost all indices 
examined exhibited negative abnormal returns initially, but the market sentiment turned 
around approximately 7 days after the elections. All in all, the results suggest that the 
2012 elections had a negative short-term impact on the stock markets. 
 
Table 4. Abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns of three US industry indices 
around the 2012 U.S. Presidential Elections. The event date is 07.11.2012. 
Indices/Markets 
Event-day 
AR 
T=  -2 to +2 
CAR 
6-day CAR 11-day CAR 
Aerospace & Defense -3.14*** -2.34 -6.15*** -3.47** 
 
(0.92) (1.61) (1.39) (1.41) 
Healthcare -1.74** -2.12** -4.00*** -1.63 
 
(0.71) (0.88) (0.82) (0.91) 
Financial Services -3.59*** -4.10*** -7.50*** -5.17*** 
 
(1.12) (1.52) (1.23) (1.33) 
 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
Table 4 presents the abnormal returns for aerospace & defence, healthcare and financial 
services sectors on their first trading day after the 2012 elections. CARs for the T = -2 to 
+2, 6-day and 11-day event windows are also presented. Figure 10 illustrates the daily 
abnormal returns for these industries over the window from T = -10 to T = +10. Opposite 
to the 2016 elections, all three industry indices exhibited statistically significant negative 
ARs on their first trading day after the elections. The aerospace & defense index had a  
-3.14% abnormal return, healthcare index a -1.74% AR and the financial services index 
a -3.59% AR. In addition, all three industries experienced negative CARs throughout all 
three event windows, many of the CARs also being statistically significant. This is again 
in line with the hypothesis that regulation-sensitive industries react negatively to 
Democratic presidential election winners. 
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Figure 9. Abnormal returns around 2012 U.S. Presidential Elections – industry indices. 
5.3. 2008 U.S. Presidential Elections 
Table 5. Abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns for six major world indices 
around the 2008 U.S. Presidential Elections. The event date is 05.11.2008. 
Indices/Markets 
Event-day 
AR 
T=  -2 to +2 
CAR 
6-day CAR 11-day CAR 
S&P 500 -5.21*** -2.99** -15.37*** -19.90*** 
 
(2.15) (3.92) (2.98) (3.88) 
Dow Jones Industrial -5.01*** -3.30 -13.97*** -16.60*** 
 
(2.00) (3.64) (2.89) (3.70) 
NASDAQ Composite -5.50*** -3.40 -16.01*** -22.86*** 
 
(2.21) (3.56) (2.75) (3.75) 
EURO STOXX 50 -1.38 1.67 -12.26*** -15.49*** 
 
(2.24) (3.98) (3.19) (2.98) 
Hang Seng Index 3.43 3.49 -1.30 -8.16** 
 (2.72) (4.01) (4.26) (3.74) 
Nikkei 225 4.63* -3.71 -3.07 -6.68* 
 
(2.50) (5.22) (4.41) (3.75) 
 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 5 presents the abnormal returns for six major world indices on their first trading 
day after the result of the 2008 elections was published, which was the 5th of November 
2008. In addition, the CARs for the T = -2 to +2, 6-day and 11-day event windows 
following the 5th of November are presented. Figure 10 illustrates the daily abnormal 
returns over the window from T = -10 to T = +10. 
 
As figure 11 illustrates, U.S. indices once again exhibit very similar abnormal returns 
around the presidential elections. The event-day ARs for all three were highly negative 
and statistically significant at the 1% level, which suggests that U.S. markets saw the 
result as negative news. The CARs were also negative and statistically significant during 
all three event windows at the 1% level. Nasdaq index slumped the most, experiencing a 
whopping -22.86% CAR during the 11-day window. This could indicate that the U.S. 
stock markets took the result badly. However, during the time, market volatility was very 
high due to the financial crisis, making it hard to tell what part of the negative abnormal 
returns were because of the elections and what part due to general market instability and 
negative sentiment. 
 
European markets had a milder initial reaction, even though still negative. However, the 
6-day and 11-day CARs followed their U.S. counterparts and were highly negative with 
a 1% statistical significance level. Hang Seng and Nikkei 225, on the contrary, had a large 
positive AR on their first trading day after the elections. The Asian indices experienced 
less negative CARs throughout all three event windows as well, the 11-day CAR being 
the only statistically significant one. Overall, the results suggest that U.S. markets saw 
the election result as negative news, whereas international markets were not impacted as 
much. 
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Figure 10. Daily abnormal returns around the 2008 U.S. Presidential Elections for six 
major world stock indices. 
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Figure 11. Daily abnormal returns around the 2008 U.S. Presidential Elections - U.S. 
Indices vs World Indices. 
5.4. 2004 U.S. Presidential Elections 
 
Table 6. Abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns for six major world indices 
around the 2004 U.S. Presidential Elections. The event date is 03.11.2004. 
Indices/Markets 
Event-day 
AR 
T=  -2 to +2 
CAR 
6-day CAR 11-day CAR 
S&P 500 1.11 3.14*** 2.84*** 4.47*** 
 
(0.71) (0.63) (0.67) (0.65) 
Dow Jones Industrial 1.03 3.65*** 3.58*** 5.27*** 
 
(0.69) (0.65) (0.65) (0.61) 
NASDAQ Composite 1.00 3.29*** 2.60*** 5.86*** 
 
(1.12) (0.33) (0.52) (0.65) 
EURO STOXX 50 0.19 2.22*** 0.61** 2.32*** 
 
(0.92) (0.32) (0.26) (0.60) 
Hang Seng Index 0.68 3.36*** 2.75*** 3.91*** 
 (1.06) (0.62) (0.55) (0.77) 
Nikkei 225 -0.01 2.61*** 0.92* 2.10** 
 
(1.15) (0.65) (0.55) (0.94) 
 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 6 presents the abnormal returns for six major world indices on their first trading 
day after the 2004 elections, which was the 3rd of November 2004. In addition, the CARs 
for the T = -2 to +2, 6-day and 11-day event windows following the 3rd of November are 
presented. Figure 13 illustrates the daily abnormal returns over the window from T = -10 
to T = +10. 
 
Same as with previous elections that were examined in this study, U.S. indices behaved 
quite similarly. This is illustrated also in figure 12. The S&P 500, Dow Jones and Nasdaq 
all had an approximately one percent abnormal return on their first trading day after the 
2004 elections. The CARs were also positive and statistically significant at the 1% level 
throughout all three event windows. These findings suggest that the 2004 elections had a 
short-term impact on U.S. stock markets, and that the victory of George Bush and the 
republicans was received positively by the markets. These results, in addition to those 
found from the 2016 presidential election, support the existence of a party effect, 
according to which stock markets are more favorable to the election of a Republican 
President than to a Democrat.  In line with Niederhoffer et al. (1970) who demonstrated 
that stock prices increased on the days following the election of a Republican presidential 
candidate eight times out of nine before 1970, domestic markets rose twice out of three 
times a Republican was elected as President of the United States during the 21st century. 
On the contrary, this positive short-term effect did not happen following the Democrat 
victories of 2008 and 2012. 
 
 
Figure 12. Daily abnormal returns around the 2004 U.S. Presidential Elections - U.S. 
Indices vs World Indices. 
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European and Asian markets had fairly similar results than their U.S. counterparts. The 
Eurostoxx 50 index exhibited a small initial abnormal return on the event day, and all 
three event windows had statistically significant positive CARs (6-day CAR at the 5% 
level, the two other windows at the 1% level). The Hang Seng index had a 0.68% 
abnormal return on its first trading day after the 2004 elections. The CARs were also 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level throughout all three event windows. 
Nikkei 225, on the other hand, had a small -0,01% AR on the event day, but CARs during 
all three event windows were positive and statistically significant (at the 1%, 10% and 
5% levels). Altogether, the results suggest that the 2004 U.S. presidential elections did 
have an impact on both U.S. and world markets, and that the news of Bush and the 
Republicans winning the elections was received positively. Also, the results from the 
2004 elections further imply that investors cannot find diversification against domestic 
political risk from U.S. stock markets. 
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Figure 13. Daily abnormal returns around the 2004 U.S. Presidential Elections for six 
major world stock indices. 
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5.5. 2000 U.S. Presidential Elections 
As mentioned earlier, the 2000 U.S. presidential elections had a distinctive element 
compared to other elections. For the first time in the U.S. modern history, it took more 
than five weeks for a winner to officially emerge. U.S citizens went to the polls on 
November 7, 2000. Usually, the final results would be announced by the end of the 
following day the latest, but this time George W. Bush didn’t emerge as a clear winner 
until December 13th the same year because the election was so tight that it required vote 
recounts. Nippani & Medlin (2002) examined the impact the late declaration of the U.S. 
Presidential Election winner had on the stock markets at the end of 2000. They found that 
the delay had a negative short-term impact on U.S. stock markets. In this study, the first 
trading day after the results were finally clear is examined to see if there was another 
market reaction at that point. 
 
Table 7. Abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns for six major world indices 
around the 2000 U.S. Presidential Elections. The event date is 13.12.2000. 
Indices/Markets 
Event-day 
AR 
T=  -2 to +2 
CAR 
6-day CAR 11-day CAR 
S&P 500 -0.82 -4.30*** -8.07*** -2.71* 
 
(1.36) (0.96) (1.22) (1.58) 
Dow Jones Industrial 0.27 -2.50*** -4.11*** 1.21 
 
(1.28) (1.03) (1.54) (1.46) 
NASDAQ Composite -3.77 -9.38*** -22.73*** -13.41*** 
 
(3.00) (2.62) (1.90) (3.69) 
EURO STOXX 50 -1.17 -3.57*** -6.40*** -4.68*** 
 
(1.36) (1.28) (1.68) (1.50) 
Hang Seng Index 1.90 -1.37 -2.58 -3.77*** 
 (1.87) (1.89) (1.78) (1.43) 
Nikkei 225 -0.65 1.35 -6.12*** -7.06*** 
 
(1.40) (1.22) (1.27) (1.92) 
 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 7 presents the abnormal returns for six major world indices on their first trading 
day after the result of the 2000 elections was declared, which was the 3rd of November 
2000. In addition, the CARs for the T = -2 to +2, 6-day and 11-day event windows 
following the 13th of December are presented. Figure 14 illustrates the daily abnormal 
returns over the window from T = -10 to T = +10. 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Daily abnormal returns around the 2000 U.S. Presidential Elections for six 
major world stock indices. 
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As can be seen from table 7 and figure 14, U.S. markets performed rather poorly after the 
election result was announced. S&P 500 had negative CARs throughout all three event 
windows with a statistical significance of 1% for the two first windows. However, the 
U.S. markets started to rebound approximately six days after the event day. Dow Jones 
also had statistically significant negative CARs during the two first event windows but 
had an even stronger rebound bringing the 11-day CAR back to positive.  
 
Nasdaq, on the other hand, had a similar trend than the S&P 500, but the negative CARs 
following the event day were even bigger. The event day AR for Nasdaq was negative (-
3.77%) and CARs during all three event windows were also negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% level, even though Nasdaq also started to rebound around six days 
after the event day. However, because of the burst of the so-called dot-com bubble, 
Nasdaq was very volatile during the period, making it harder to analyze the potential 
effects of the elections. European and Asian indices behaved somewhat similarly than the 
U.S. indices, exhibiting mainly negative returns. The Eurostoxx 50 experienced 
statistically significant negative CARs during all three event windows at the 1% level. 
Overall, the results indicate that the markets did have a short-term negative reaction to 
the election announcement, but since the markets were volatile at the time, it is hard to 
make definite conclusions. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
A substantial body of literature shows that political uncertainty has an impact on both 
stock market returns and risk levels. In developed countries, presidential elections are 
considered as one of the most influential political events. Therefore, it is intuitively 
plausible that presidential elections might have an effect on stock markets as well. The 
importance of U.S. Presidential elections is further bolstered due to the profound status 
of the United States in the global world, and the fact that the office of the President has a 
lot of power in the U.S. compared to most developed countries. 
 
This thesis contributes to existing literature by examining the short-term effects that U.S. 
presidential elections have on the stock market. Elections from 2000 to 2016 are studied. 
A special focus is placed on the 2016 U.S. presidential elections, due to their particular 
nature and because they are the most recent elections. The event study methodology is 
employed to examine the stock market’s reaction. Daily price data from six major world 
indices is used. The indices are the S&P 500, Dow Jones Industrial Average, NASDAQ 
Composite, EUROSTOXX 5O, Nikkei 225 and the Hang Seng index. 
 
The overall results imply that U.S. presidential elections do have a short-term impact on 
the stock markets. Regarding stock market returns, this impact seems to be stronger for 
domestic markets. U.S. indices also exhibit very similar abnormal returns around each 
election period under examination. Foreign markets, on the other hand, seem to exhibit 
more mixed results. European and Asian indices tend to experience larger than normal 
abnormal returns and increased market volatility around and following the elections, but 
this impact is not as clear as in the U.S. markets. In general, European markets seem to 
follow their U.S. counterparts more accurately than Asian markets. 
 
The findings of this study seem to give some level of support to the idea that the markets 
prefer Republicans over the Democrats. From the five elections examined, three winners 
were Republican and two Democrats. The markets reacted negatively to both Democratic 
victories (2008 and 2012). From the three Republican election winners, two were received 
positively by the markets and only one had a negative short-term impact. It was 
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hypothesized that industries that are sensitive to government policies and regulations 
would prefer the Republicans. Measured by the reaction of aerospace & defence, 
healthcare and financial services sectors, this seems to be the case. These three industries 
all exhibit strong gains when a Republican candidate wins the elections, and negative 
when a Democrat wins. 
 
These findings have the following implications for investors. Firstly, diversifying across 
U.S. markets won’t help protect against election induced uncertainty. International 
diversification, on the other hand, seems to offer some advantages. Especially Asian 
markets appear to react differently to the presidential elections, sometimes even opposite 
to U.S. markets. Secondly, some industries are more sensitive to political events, which 
should be taken into account by investors who own shares of such companies. For 
example, investors who have invested in the defence, healthcare or financial services 
sectors might want to rebalance their portfolios before presidential elections. Overall, the 
empirical findings of this study indicate that political risk and U.S. presidential elections 
have an impact on the stock market, and that taking elections into account when making 
investment decisions may be beneficial. 
 
Compared to previous research, the results of this thesis do not highlight major 
differences that could be attributed to the recent digitalisation of global markets and 
economies. Therefore, future research ideas could include examining how the social 
media activity and online influence (e.g. Twitter activity) of presidents and other world 
leaders impact the stock markets. This form of political risk is a relatively new 
phenomenon, and it could reveal interesting findings. Also, the effects of U.S. presidential 
elections on international stock markets are still not understood well enough. Therefore, 
further research on the topic is still needed. 
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